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Abstract  31 
Humans are better at integrating desirable information into their beliefs than undesirable. This 32 
asymmetry poses an evolutionary puzzle, as it can lead to an underestimation of risk and thus 33 
failure to take precautionary action. Here, we suggest a mechanism that can speak to this 34 
conundrum. In particular, we show that the bias vanishes in response to perceived threat in 35 
the environment. We report that an improvement in participants’ tendency to incorporate bad 36 
news into their beliefs is associated with physiological arousal in response to threat indexed 37 
by galvanic skin response and self-reported anxiety. This pattern of results was observed in a 38 
controlled laboratory setting (Experiment I), where perceived threat was manipulated, and in 39 
firefighters on duty (Experiment II), where it naturally varied. Such flexibility in how 40 
individuals integrate information may enhance the likelihood of responding to warnings with 41 
caution in environments rife with threat, while maintaining a positivity bias otherwise, a 42 
strategy that can increase well-being.  43 
  44 
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Significance Statement  45 
The human tendency to be overly optimistic has mystified scholars and lay people for 46 
decades: how could biased beliefs have been selected for over unbiased beliefs? Scholars 47 
have suggested that while the optimism bias can lead to negative outcomes, including 48 
financial collapse and war, it can also facilitate health and productivity. Here, we demonstrate 49 
that a mechanism generating the optimism bias, namely asymmetric information integration, 50 
evaporates under threat. Such flexibility could result in enhanced caution in dangerous 51 
environments while supporting an optimism bias otherwise, potentially increasing well-being. 52 
  53 
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Introduction  54 
Whether a piece of news is good or bad is critical in determining whether it will alter our 55 
beliefs. In particular, people readily incorporate favorable news into their existing beliefs, yet 56 
tend to underweight the strength of unfavorable information (Eil and Rao, 2011; Kuzmanovic 57 
and Rigoux, 2017; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Lefebvre et al., 2017; Mobius et al., 2012; 58 
Sharot et al., 2011; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). For example, when learning that their risk of 59 
experiencing future aversive events, such as robbery, is higher than they had expected, people 60 
are less likely to integrate these data into prior beliefs relative to a situation in which they 61 
learn that their risk is lower than expected (Sharot et al., 2011). The same pattern emerges 62 
when people receive desirable and undesirable information about their financial prospects 63 
(Wiswall and Zafar, 2015), or feedback about their intellectual abilities (Eil and Rao, 2011; 64 
Mobius et al., 2012), personality (Korn et al., 2012) and physical traits (Eil and Rao, 2011). 65 
This is known as a valence-dependent learning asymmetry (Sharot and Garrett, 2016).  66 
 67 
Incorporating desirable information about the self at a higher rate than undesirable (Korn et 68 
al., 2012) will subsequently lead to overconfidence and optimistically biased predictions 69 
(Sharot et al., 2011). On the upside an optimistic outlook, even when biased, can improve 70 
physical and mental health (Taylor and Brown, 1988), boost motivation (Bandura, 1989), 71 
exploration (Tiger, 1979) and persistence (Sherman, 1980), thus enhancing success and well-72 
being (for a review, see (Chang, 2001). However, ignoring negative information can result in 73 
faulty assessment and lack of precautionary action leading to, for example, ill preparedness in 74 
the face of natural disasters, and financial market bubbles (Shefrin, 2009) .  75 
 76 
These apparent costs present a conundrum; why have humans evolved a bias in learning that 77 
leads to systematic errors in judgement? The common answer is that people make errors that 78 
are costly in certain situations, because those errors are advantageous in other situations, and 79 
on balance the benefits outweigh the costs (McKay and Dennett, 2010). There is another 80 
possibility though - that the asymmetry fluctuates in response to environmental demands. For 81 
example, in relatively safe surroundings, where potential harm is low, an asymmetry in 82 
information integration may be prominent leading to biased expectations. Yet in 83 
environments rife with threats, a physiological/psychological response may trigger changes to 84 
how information is integrated leading to more balanced information integration which may be 85 
adaptive in environments where potential costs are high (see Johnson and Fowler, 2011).  86 
 87 
Because affect provides an internal signal about the external context, it could potentially be 88 
used to adaptively modulate cognitive biases. Specifically, we suggest that the key is a 89 
learning mechanism that is modulated by the two core aspects of affect: valence and arousal. 90 
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A valence-dependent learning mechanism biases judgements and an arousal-dependent switch 91 
controls the degree and perhaps sign of the bias. 92 
 93 
To test this prediction, we exposed participants to an acute threat manipulation in the lab 94 
(Experiment I) or tested participants in a real-life environment (firefighters tested on call, 95 
Experiment II). After measuring indicators of arousal, stress and anxiety, participants 96 
completed the belief update task (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et 97 
al., 2014; Kappes et al., 2018; Korn et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Moutsiana et 98 
al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) (Fig. 1). Past studies have shown that 99 
participants put more weight on good news (i.e. that a negative life event is less likely to 100 
occur than expected, Fig. 1a) compared to bad news (i.e. that a negative event is more likely 101 
to occur than expected, Fig. 1b) in altering beliefs in this task. Here we test whether 102 
heightened response to threat abolishes this bias.  103 
 104 
Materials & Methods 105 
 106 
Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis: Experiment I 107 
Participants. Thirty-six participants recruited via the UCL participant pool participated in the 108 
study. Participants gave informed consent and were paid for their participation. The study was 109 
approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University College London. One 110 
participant’s responses resulted in only two good news trials (out of a possible 40), which 111 
prevented us from calculating a meaningful information integration parameter (we define how 112 
we calculate information integration parameters below), thus this participant’s data had to be 113 
excluded. Two participant’s cortisol samples were insufficient for analysis, and samples of six 114 
participants who were suspected to have depression (BDI score greater than 10) were never 115 
sent to be analyzed. Thus, analysis that includes cortisol scores is given for n = 27. Note, 116 
however, that either excluding those participants all together from all analysis or including 117 
them as done here generated similar results. Each participant was randomly assigned to either 118 
the threat manipulation condition (13 females, 6 males, mean age = 26.37 years, SD = 6.58) 119 
or the control condition (10 females, 6 males, mean age = 24.94 years, SD = 3.82).  120 
 121 
Manipulation Procedure. We designed the experiment such that the perceived threat was 122 
unrelated to the information presented in the task. Thus, we could test whether the effect of 123 
perceived threat on information integration was general rather than specific to the source of 124 
the threat itself.  125 
 126 
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Participants assigned to the threat manipulation group were told that they would be exposed 127 
to an uncomfortable, stressful, event at the end of the study. Specifically, they were informed 128 
that at the end of the experiment they would be required to deliver a speech on a surprise 129 
topic, which would be recorded on video and judged live by a panel of staff members. They 130 
were shown an adjacent room across a double mirror window where chairs and tables were 131 
already organized for the panel. In addition, participants were presented with six difficult 132 
mathematical problems which they were asked to try and solve in 30 seconds. This 133 
manipulation is a variation of the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) (Birkett, 2011) with the 134 
main difference between the typical TSST procedure and the one used here being that 135 
participants were threatened by the possibility of a stressful social event, and completed the 136 
main task under threat, but the threat was never executed. Having the participants believe the 137 
stressful event will take place at the end of the task, rather than before, increased the 138 
likelihood that participants’ arousal levels remained high throughout the task. Participants 139 
assigned to the control condition were informed that at the end of the experiment they would 140 
be required to write a short essay on a surprise topic, which would not be judged. They were 141 
then presented with six elementary mathematical problems to solve in 30 seconds.  142 
 143 
Manipulation Check. We examine if the threat manipulation resulted in the following 144 
psychological and physiological changes, which are typically observed in studies using 145 
variations of TSST (Birkett, 2011). 146 
 147 
1. Self-Report. Before and after the induction procedure participants filled out a short-148 
form of the State scale of the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory developed by 149 
Marteau and Bekker (Marteau and Bekker, 1992). Participants reported their current 150 
anxiety state according to 6 statements (e.g. I am worried) on a 4-point Likert scale (1 151 
= not at all to 4 = very much). Possible scores range from 6 to 24 with high scores 152 
indicating high levels of state anxiety. 153 
2. Skin Conductance Level (SCL). SCL is an index of sympathetic tone which reflects 154 
changes in autonomic arousal. Skin conductance was recorded for 2 minutes pre- and 155 
post-induction whilst participants stared at a fixation cross using disposable 156 
electrodermal gel electrodes (Biopac, EL507) attached to the distal phalanx of the 157 
pointer and middle fingers of the participants’ non-dominant hand. Skin conductance 158 
responses were monitored using a MP36R system (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, 159 
CA) and analyzed with BIOPAC software AcqKnowledge. The difference in mean 160 
SCL in each period were taken as a change in participants’ autonomic arousal levels.  161 
3. Cortisol Level. To measure changes in participants’ cortisol levels, saliva samples 162 
were collected using Salivette collection devices, (Salimetrics, UK). Four samples 163 
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were taken at different time points: before the induction procedure (baseline: t0); 164 
immediately after the induction procedure but prior to undertaking the task (10 min 165 
after the threat/control manipulation: t1); halfway through the task (30min after the 166 
threat/control manipulation: t2); after the task and completion of post experiment 167 
questionnaires (+1hr after the threat/control manipulation: t3). The experiment was 168 
conducted between 2pm and 4pm, restricted to these times to control for the diurnal 169 
cycle of cortisol. Samples were stored at -80°C before being assayed. Analysis of 170 
salivary cortisol was completed by Salimetrics. Intra-assay and inter-assay 171 
coefficients of variation were all below 6.1% (M = 1.5%, SD = 1.2). Cortisol values 172 
were measured in μg/dL. Shapiro-Wilk (SW) tests on cortisol levels at each sample 173 
period revealed that these were not normally distributed (one sample SW < .01 for all 174 
four sample intervals). As a result, cortisol values were log transformed. Since 175 
cortisol stress response has a temporal delay (mediated by the slower time scale HPA 176 
axis), it is difficult to precisely align the time of the cortisol response to perceived 177 
levels of threat at different points in the task. Because of this, the main cortisol 178 
measure we use in the manuscript was calculate as the mean difference between 179 
cortisol levels at time periods t1, t2 and t3 from baseline cortisol levels at t0, as done 180 
previously (Lenow et al., 2017; Lighthall et al., 2013; Otto et al., 2013). This measure 181 
represents the average cortisol response throughout the duration of task performance. 182 
Below is the formula we used to derive this index where log cort is the natural log-183 
transformed cortisol concentrations: 184 
 185 
 ܿ݋ݎݐο ൌ 
 ܿ݋ݎݐ௧ଵ ൅  ܿ݋ݎݐ௧ଶ ൅  ܿ݋ݎݐ௧ଷ
͵
െ  ܿ݋ݎݐ௧଴ 
 186 
Behavioral Task. The task was adopted from past studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett 187 
and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2013; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot 188 
et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b).  189 
 190 
Stimuli. Stimuli (80 short descriptions of different negative life events, for example: domestic 191 
burglary, card fraud) were separated into two lists, each containing 40 events. Participants 192 
were randomly assigned one of the two lists of 40 evens at the start of the experiment. For 193 
each event the average probability of that event occurring at least once to someone from the 194 
UK within the same age range as the participants was calculated from data compiled from 195 
online resources (including the Office for National Statistics and PubMed). Very rare or very 196 
common events were not included; all event probabilities lay between 10% and 70%. To 197 
ensure that the range of possible overestimation was equal to the range of possible 198 
 
 
 
8 
underestimation, participants were told that the range of probabilities lay between 3% and 199 
77% and they were only permitted to enter estimates within this range. Note that differences 200 
between the average probabilities provided to participants and the actual probabilities for the 201 
sample of participants tested cannot explain differences between the two groups, as we 202 
randomly assign participants to either the threat manipulation condition of the control 203 
condition.  204 
 205 
Behavioral Task (Fig. 1). Participants completed a practice session comprising 3 trials 206 
before beginning the main experiment. The main experiment comprised 40 trials. On each 207 
trial one of 40 adverse life events were presented for 3s, and participants were asked to 208 
estimate how likely the event was to happen to them in the future. Participants had up to 5s to 209 
respond. If participants had already experienced an event in their lifetime they were instructed 210 
to estimate the likelihood of that event happening to them again in the future. If the 211 
participant failed to respond, that trial was excluded from all subsequent analyses (M = 1.31, 212 
SD = 1.39). Following presentation of a fixation cross (5-10s jittered) participants were then 213 
presented with the base rate of the event in a demographically similar population for 2s 214 
followed by a fixation cross (5-10s jittered). In a second session, immediately after the first, 215 
participants were asked again to provide estimates of their likelihood of encountering the 216 
same events so that we could assess how they updated their estimate in response to the 217 
information presented. 218 
 219 
Note, that studies have shown that the update bias exists both when classifying trials 220 
according to participants’ estimates of self-risk and when trials are classified according to 221 
estimates of base rates (Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015). Thus, we used 222 
the traditional design and analysis here (Sharot et al., 2011) . Moreover, multiple past studies 223 
have shown that the amount of update bias does not alter whether participants are asked to 224 
estimate the likelihood of the event happening in the future or the likelihood of the event not 225 
happening in the future (Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Sharot et al., 2011). 226 
Thus, scores are not driven by response to high and low numbers, but rather by valence per 227 
se. As this has been established in the past we used the standard version of the task here (i.e. 228 
eliciting estimation of an event happening).  229 
 230 
Memory control. To test for memory effects participants were asked at the end of the 231 
experiment to provide the actual probability previously presented of each event. Memory 232 
errors were calculated as the absolute difference between the probability previously presented 233 
and the participants’ recollection of that statistic: 234 
 235 
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Memory Error = | Probability Presented − Recollection of Probability Presented | 236 
 237 
Other controls. At the end of experiment, participants also rated stimuli on 6-point scales for 238 
vividness [for the question “How vividly could you imagine this event?” (1 = not at all vivid 239 
to 6 = very vividly)], familiarity [for the question “Regardless if this event has happened to 240 
you before, how familiar do you feel it is to you from TV, friends, movies, and so on?” (1 = 241 
not at all familiar to 6 = very familiar)], prior experience [for the question “Has this event 242 
happened to you before?” (1 = never to 6 = very often)], emotional arousal [for the question 243 
“When you imagine this event, how emotionally arousing do you find the image in your 244 
mind?” (1 = not at all arousing to 6 = very arousing)] and negativity [for the question “How 245 
negative would this event be/is this event for you?” 1 = not negative at all to 6 = very 246 
negative)].  247 
 248 
Statistical analysis. Trials were partitioned according to participants’ first estimates into ones 249 
in which participants received good news [i.e., the probability presented was lower than the 250 
first estimate of their own probability (Fig. 1a)] or bad news [i.e., the probability presented 251 
was higher (Fig. 1b)]. While information can be better or worse than expected, all stimuli are 252 
negative (i.e. robbery, card fraud), thus comparison is never between positive and negative 253 
stimuli, but between information that is better or worse than expected.  254 
 255 
Trials for which the estimation error was zero were excluded from subsequent analyses as 256 
these could not be categorized into either condition (M = 0.89 trials, SD = 0.92).  257 
 258 
For each trial an estimation error term was calculated as the difference between the 259 
probability presented and participants’ first estimate on that trial: 260 
 261 
Estimation Error = Probability Presented - First Estimate 262 
 263 
Update was calculated for each trial such that positive updates indicate a change toward the 264 
probability presented and negative updates a change away from the probability presented:  265 
 266 
Update (Good News) = First Estimate – Second Estimate 267 
Update (Bad News) = Second Estimate – First Estimate 268 
 269 
Formal models suggest that learning from information that disconfirms one’s expectations is 270 
mediated by a prediction error signal that quantifies a difference between expectation and 271 
outcome (Sutton and Barto, 1998). We have previously shown that an analogous mechanism 272 
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underpins belief updating in this task (Sharot et al., 2011). Specifically, the difference 273 
between participants’ initial estimations and the information provided (that is, estimation 274 
error = probability presented – first estimate) predicts subsequent updates, as would be 275 
expected from learning models (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Hence, similar to our previous 276 
papers (Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011), we estimated the 277 
extent to which participants integrated new information into their beliefs by correlating 278 
estimation errors and update scores with one another separately for good and bad news trials 279 
for each participant. This resulted in two pearson correlation values for each participant: one 280 
for good news trials and one for bad news trials. We denote these Pearson correlation scores 281 
as good news (αG) and bad news (αB) information integration parameters. Shapiro-Wilk tests 282 
were applied to check the values of αG and αB were normally distributed. To check the values 283 
of αG and αB were not at floor or ceiling, we conducted one sample t-tests (separately αG and 284 
αB) against values of 0 (to test for floor effects) and 1 (to test for ceiling effects). 285 
 286 
To determine whether information integration from good and/or bad news was altered by the 287 
threat manipulation, the resulting information integration parameters were submitted to a 2 by 288 
2 ANOVA with valence (good/bad news) as a repeated-measure and group (threat 289 
manipulation/control) as a between-subjects factor.  290 
 291 
We identified possible confounds to add as covariates to our analysis as follows; first, for 292 
factors that were not task related and therefore did not have a valence component 293 
(specifically: initial self-reported anxiety, initial SCL, initial cortisol and BDI) we conducted 294 
independent sample t-tests (control vs threat manipulation group) for each factor separately to 295 
determine if a group difference existed (Table 1). For task related variables that could be 296 
divided by valence (specifically; number of trials, memory scores, ratings on familiarity, 297 
vividness, past experience, negativity, emotional arousal and mean first estimates) we 298 
calculated the difference between mean good news and mean bad news for each participant 299 
for each of these factors. This gives a bias score for each factor for each subject whereby 300 
positive scores indicate a bias towards good news and negative scores indicate a bias towards 301 
bad news. We then conducted a one sample t-test (versus 0) on each of these scores for each 302 
group separately to isolate those factors which had valence effects in either set of participants. 303 
Next we conducted a series of independent sample t-tests to compare the control groups 304 
difference scores to the threat manipulation groups scores for each factor (this is equivalent to 305 
testing for an interaction between valence and group). For all of these tests we applied a 306 
threshold of p<0.05 and deliberately did not correct for multiple comparisons. This is because 307 
the purpose was to identify all potential confounds; by not correcting we are being more 308 
stringent. Any factor which showed a group effect or a valence effect was added as a 309 
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covariate. These were: mean first estimates, ratings of vividness, familiarity, past experience 310 
and emotional arousal (Table 1).  311 
 312 
To explore whether differences in information integration related to any of the specific 313 
physiological and psychological changes, we constructed a general linear model (GLM) with 314 
α entered as the dependent variable and changes in SCL, self-report anxiety and cortisol as 315 
independent variables. This was done separately for information integration parameters for 316 
good (αG) and bad (αB) news. To control for general changes in information integration and 317 
allow us to detect valence-specific effects, we entered information integration parameters for 318 
good news (αG) as a covariate when estimating information integration parameters for bad 319 
news (αB) and vice versa (Moutsiana et al., 2013). In addition, following the same selection 320 
procedure outlined above we controlled for any variable where there was a significant 321 
(p<0.05) difference between groups, between types of information (i.e. valence) or a 322 
group*valence interaction, by including these in the GLM as covariates.  323 
 324 
For αB the formula for the regression in full therefore is as follows: 325 
 326 
αB = β0 + β1*Change in SCL + β2*Change in Self-report + β3*Change in Cortisol + 327 
β4*Mean Initial Estimate + β5*Initial Self-report anxiety+ β6*Mean Bad News Vividness 328 
Rating + β7*Mean Bad News Familiarity Rating + β8*Mean Prior Experience Bad News 329 
Rating + β9*Mean Emotional Arousal Bad News Rating + β10*αG 330 
 331 
For (αG) the formula for this was as follows:  332 
 333 
αG = β0 + β1*Change in SCL + β2*Change in Self-report + β3*Change in Cortisol + 334 
β4*Mean Initial Estimate + β5*Initial Self-report anxiety + β6*Mean Good News Vividness 335 
Rating + β7*Mean Good News Familiarity Rating + β8*Mean Prior Experience Good News 336 
Rating + β9*Mean Emotional Arousal Good News Rating + β10*αB 337 
 338 
Finally, we reran the analysis above this time controlling for within-subject covariates at the 339 
within-subject level and between-subject factors at the between-subject level. Specifically, for 340 
each participant we computed an alternative set of information integration parameters – one 341 
for good news (αG_partial) and one for bad news (αB_partial) - by carrying out a series of partial 342 
correlations in which absolute estimation error and update were the two variables of interest. 343 
Within-subject covariates - identified as above (first estimate, vividness, familiarity, past 344 
experience and emotional arousal) - were controlled for on a trial by trial basis. We examined 345 
whether these alternative information integration parameters for bad news (αB_partial) related to 346 
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change in self report and/or change in SCL controlling for any additional between subject 347 
confounds as above (initial self-report anxiety ratings and information integration for good 348 
news). This was done by entering alternative information integration parameters for bad news 349 
(αB_partial) as the dependent variable into 2 GLMs as follows:  350 
 351 
αB_partial = β0 + β1*Change in Self-report + β2*Initial Self-report anxiety+ β3*αG_partial 352 
αB_partial = β0 + β1*Change in SCL + β2*Initial Self-report + β3*αG_partial 353 
 354 
We then examined the significance of the regression weights in each GLM for change in Self 355 
Report and change in SCL. To visualize the effect of each of these (Fig. 4) we generated two 356 
partial regression plots. These are scatterplots of the residuals of the dependent variable 357 
(αB_partial) and the independent variable (either Change in Self-report or Change in SCL) when 358 
these are regressed on the rest of the independent variables (Initial Self report and αG_partial). 359 
 360 
We ran the equivalent analysis for good news (αG_partial) as follows: 361 
 362 
αG_partial = β0 + β1*Change in Self-report + β2*Initial Self-report + β3*αB_partial 363 
αG_partial = β0 + β1*Change in SCL + β2*Initial Self-report + β3*αB_partial 364 
 365 
Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis: Experiment II 366 
 367 
Participants. Thirty-three operational staff stationed across seventeen fire stations within the 368 
South Metro Fire and Rescue Authority of the State of Colorado in the United States 369 
participated in the study. Five of these participants failed to complete the study leaving 28 370 
participants (1 female, 27 males, mean age = 43.15 years, SD = 9.87). A link to an online 371 
version of the experiment was sent by email to operational staff inviting them to participate in 372 
the study whilst on duty. Employees were given 18 days to attempt the experiment. They 373 
were permitted to take the experiment once in this time period and were explicitly requested 374 
to do so whilst on shift (i.e. in the station between calls). Participation in the experiment was 375 
anonymous, voluntary and unpaid.  376 
 377 
Task, stimuli and control variables. An online version of the task used in Experiment I was 378 
designed using Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The task began by asking 379 
basic demographic questions (age, gender, marital status, level of education and number of 380 
children) and some questions pertaining to their work (including how long they had worked in 381 
the service, how many people they supervised, number of emergency they went on, what their 382 
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rank in the service was) and social environment (social support at work and outside, and 383 
stress experienced at home). 384 
 385 
After providing this information, participants read task instructions on screen at their own 386 
pace and then undertook a practice session comprising 3 practice trials. As in Experiment I, 387 
stimuli (80 short descriptions of different negative life events; the majority of these were the 388 
same as those used in Experiment I but 18 events were exchanged with alternative negative 389 
life events) were separated into two lists, each containing 40 negative life events. Participants 390 
were randomly assigned one of the two lists of 40 events at the start of the experiment. The 391 
task was the same as in Experiment I, except that there was only one fixation cross displayed 392 
in each session (for 1s) after participants submitted estimates (i.e. in the first session, unlike in 393 
Experiment I, a second fixation cross was not displayed after base rate presentation). 394 
Furthermore, mindful of the firefighters’ unpredictable time constraints, memory for the 395 
information given and subjective ratings (past experience with the event and negativity) were 396 
elicited for half the stimuli and participants completed a short version of the state scale of the 397 
self-report at the beginning of the study (Chlan et al., 2003), without providing physiological 398 
measures of autonomic arousal.  399 
 400 
Statistical analysis: Linear regressions were performed using ordinary least squares 401 
implemented using SPSS version 25 for bad news and good news separately, with α entered 402 
as the dependent variable and self-reported state anxiety as the independent variable. To rule 403 
out potential confounds we followed a similar procedure as in Experiment I. Specifically, we 404 
separately tested whether a range of potential confounding factors had valence effects. These 405 
factors were: mean first estimates, memory scores, ratings of negativity, ratings of past 406 
experience and number of trials. We did this by calculating the difference between mean good 407 
news and mean bad news for each participant for each of these factors. This gives a bias score 408 
for each factor for each subject whereby positive scores indicate a bias towards good news 409 
and negative scores indicate a bias towards bad news. We then conducted a one sample t-test 410 
(versus 0) on each of these scores to identify factors which had valence effects. We used a 411 
threshold of p<0.05 and deliberately did not correct for multiple comparisons. This is because 412 
the purpose was to identify all potential confounds; by not correcting we are being more 413 
stringent. Any factor which showed a valence effect was then added as a covariate. These 414 
were mean first estimates, ratings of past experience and number of trials (Table 3).  415 
 416 
To test for a relationship between anxiety and the asymmetry within the firefighters (i.e. 417 
preferential updating for bad news over good) we calculated an information integration bias 418 
score for each participant. This is simply the difference between αG and αB. A score of 0 419 
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indicates no bias in information integration in either direction whilst positive scores indicate 420 
greater information integration for good news relative to bad news and negative scores the 421 
opposite. We then examined whether the information integration bias related to self-reported 422 
anxiety as follows: 423 
 424 
Information Integration Bias Score (αG - αB) = β0 + β1*Self-Reported Anxiety + β2*Mean 425 
Initial Estimate + β3*Mean Prior Experience Bias Score (Mean Prior Experience Bad News 426 
Rating - Mean Prior Experience Good News Rating) + β4*Number of Trials Bias Score 427 
(Number of Good News Trials - Number of Bad News Trials) 428 
 429 
Next we ran a GLM for each of the two sets of information integration parameters (αG and αB) 430 
separately. To ensure effects were valence specific rather than reflecting general changes in 431 
information integration, good news (αG) was also added as a covariate when examining 432 
information integration parameters for bad news (αB) and vice versa when examining 433 
information integration for good news.  434 
 435 
For bad news information integration parameter (αB), the formula for the regression in full 436 
therefore is as follows: 437 
 438 
αB = β0 + β1*Self-Reported Anxiety + β2*Mean Initial Estimate + β3*Mean Prior 439 
Experience Bad News Rating + β4*Number of Bad News Trials + β5*αG 440 
 441 
For good news information integration parameter (αG), the formula for the regression in full 442 
therefore is as follows: 443 
 444 
αG = β0 + β1*Self-Reported Anxiety + β2*Mean Initial Estimate + β3*Mean Prior 445 
Experience Good News Rating + β4*Number of Good News Trials + β5*αB 446 
 447 
Finally, we reran the analysis above this time controlling for within-subject covariates at the 448 
within-subject level and between-subject factors at the between-subject level. Specifically, for 449 
each participant we computed an alternative set of information integration parameters – one 450 
for good news (αG_partial) and one for bad news (αB_partial) - by carrying out a series of partial 451 
correlations in which absolute estimation error and update were the two variables of interest. 452 
Within-subject covariates (first estimates), were controlled for on a trial by trial basis (note it 453 
was not possible to control for past experience on a trial by trial basis here because 454 
participants in this study completed ratings only for a subset of events). We then examined 455 
whether these alternative information integration parameters for bad news (αB_partial) related to 456 
self-reported anxiety, controlling for additional between subject covariates (number of bad 457 
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news trials and information integration for good news) at the between subject level. This was 458 
done by entering alternative information integration parameters for bad news (αB_partial) as the 459 
dependent variable into a GLM as follows:  460 
 461 
αB_partial = β0 + β1* Self-Reported Anxiety + β2*Number of Bad News Trials + β3*αG_partial 462 
 463 
We then examined the significance of the regression weight for Self-Reported Anxiety. 464 
 465 
We ran the same analysis for information integration parameters for good news (αG_partial) as 466 
follows: 467 
 468 
αG_partial = β0 + β1* Self-Reported Anxiety + β2*Number of Good News Trials + β3*αB_partial 469 
 470 
To visualize the effect of each of these (Fig. 5) we generated two partial regression plots. 471 
These are scatterplots of the residuals of the dependent variable (αB_partial or αG_partial) and the 472 
independent variable of interest (Self-Reported Anxiety) when these are regressed on the rest 473 
of the independent variables (Number of Bad News Trials and αG_partial when examining 474 
αB_partial, Number of Good News Trials and αB_partial when examining αG_partial). 475 
 476 
Results 477 
 478 
Experiment I 479 
Threat manipulation was successful. Subjective self-reports of anxiety and physiological 480 
measures of skin conductance level (SCL) and cortisol showed that the manipulation was 481 
effective. Specifically, following the manipulation, self-report anxiety (Fig. 2a) and SCL 482 
(Fig. 2b) showed an increase relative to before (baseline), which was greater in the threat 483 
manipulation group relative to controls (self-reported anxiety: t(33) = 4.16, p < .001; SCL: 484 
t(33) = 3.32, p = .002, independent sample t-test). There were no baseline (t0) differences in 485 
cortisol levels between the two groups (t(25) = -.89, p = 0.38). Mean cortisol levels (averaged 486 
across t1, t2 and t3) relative to baseline (t0) showed a trend towards being higher in the threat 487 
manipulation group relative to controls (t(25) = 1.90, p = .07). This effect was driven by a 488 
reduction in cortisol levels over time in the control group (main effect of time at t1, t2 and t3 489 
relative to baseline: F(2,26) = 17.19, p < .001, repeated measures ANOVA) - an effect 490 
previously observed when participants become familiar with a novel experiment context 491 
(Stones et al., 1999) - but an absence of this common reduction in the threat manipulation 492 
group (main effect of time: F(2,22) = 1.00, p > .25; Fig. 2c). Across participants, these 493 
measures were correlated with each other (self-report & SCL: r(33) = .39, p = .02; SCL & 494 
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cortisol: r(25) = .47, p = .01; trend for cortisol & self-report: r(25) = .33, p = .09). To control 495 
for the diurnal cycle of cortisol, each participant undertook the experiment between 2pm and 496 
4pm.  497 
 498 
Threat eliminates asymmetric information integration. Our results show that the acute 499 
threat manipulation eliminated the well-established asymmetry in information integration 500 
(Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011). Specifically, the two sets of 501 
information integration parameters (αG, αB) were entered into a group (control/threat) by 502 
valence (good news/bad news) ANOVA controlling for possible confounds (see Methods). 503 
The analysis revealed a group by valence interaction (F(1,27) = 7.56, p = .01, ηp2 = .22), 504 
which also remained if estimation errors were controlled for (F(1,26) = 7.88, p = .01) (Garrett 505 
and Sharot, 2017) and if the difference between number of good and bad news trials are 506 
controlled for (F(1,26) = 6.97, p = .01). 507 
 508 
Post hoc tests revealed that the group by valence interaction was the result of asymmetric 509 
information integration in the control group, such that the information integration parameter 510 
was larger for good news than bad (t(15) = 3.34, p = .004, paired sample t-test), but absent in 511 
the threat manipulation group (t(18) = .92, p > .25, paired sample t-test; Fig. 3). Participants 512 
in the threat manipulation group were more likely to effectively integrate bad news into their 513 
beliefs relative to those in the control group (significant difference in bad news information 514 
integration parameters αB: t(33) = 2.44, p = .02, independent sample t-test), whilst 515 
information integration parameters for good news (αG) did not differ between groups (t(33) = 516 
.611, p > .250, independent sample t-test). There were no floor or ceiling effects for αG and αB 517 
in the threat manipulation or control group (all at p < .001, one sample t-tests versus 0 and 1 518 
respectively) and participants first estimates were not significantly different from the 519 
information provided (t(34) = -0.45, p = .65, one sample t-test versus 0 on the difference 520 
between participants’ first estimates and the information provided). 521 
 522 
Past studies show that asymmetric information integration in this task is not associated with 523 
an asymmetry in memory (Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b). In fact, 524 
asymmetry in information integration is observed even when the second estimate is elicited 525 
immediately after information is on screen (Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Kuzmanovic and 526 
Rigoux, 2017). Here, we submitted memory scores to a group (threat manipulation/control) 527 
by valence (good news/bad news) ANOVA (see Methods for details). This did not reveal a 528 
main effect of valence (F(1,33) = 1.24, p > .25), or a main effect of group (F(1,33) = 1.03, p > 529 
.25) or an interaction (F(1,33) = .62, p > .25). This suggests that valence dependent changes 530 
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in information integration across groups cannot be attributed to memory or 531 
encoding/attention.  532 
 533 
Conducting an ANOVA on participants’ first estimates with valence (good/bad news) as a 534 
repeated factor and group (threat/control) as a between participant factor revealed no main 535 
effect of group (F(1,33) = 1.18, p > .25), the obvious main effect of valence (as trials are 536 
binned into good and bad according to first estimates, F(1,33) = 278.08, p < .001) and a group 537 
by valence interaction (F(1,33) = 6.71, p = .014). The interaction was characterized by the 538 
threat group providing lower first estimates than controls for stimuli which will subsequently 539 
be categorized as good news (t(33) = -2.30, p = .028) but no significant difference for trials 540 
that will be subsequently categorized as bad news (t(33) = 1.59, p = .123). Controlling for the 541 
difference between first estimates on good and bad news trials in the main ANOVA looking 542 
at information integration parameters did not alter the results (F(1,26) = 5.43, p = .028).  543 
 544 
What therefore could account for the selective fluctuations in information integration of 545 
bad news? To examine which of the changes to the psychological and physiological 546 
measures (SCL, cortisol level, self-report) could independently explain alterations in 547 
information integration of bad news, we ran a General Linear Model (GLM) in which 548 
information integration parameters for bad news (αB) were entered as the dependent variable 549 
and changes in self report, SCL, and cortisol as independent variables (all entered together in 550 
one regression). To ensure that effects were valance-specific and could not be accounted for 551 
by general changes to information integration, information integration parameters for good 552 
news (αG) were added as a covariate as done before (Moutsiana et al., 2013) [note that the 553 
same pattern of results pertains if we omit this covariate (self-reported anxiety: F(1,17) = 554 
4.75, p = 0.04, SCL: F(1,17) = 8.81, p = .009)]. We also controlled for all other possible 555 
confounds (see Methods). The analysis revealed that changes in self-reported anxiety 556 
(F(1,16) = 6.90, p = .02, bi = .03, ηp2 = .0.30) and change in physiological stress indicated by 557 
SCL (F(1,16) = 4.99, p = .04, bi = .05, ηp2 = .24) explained the variance in information 558 
integration parameters for bad news, each of which remained significant if estimation errors 559 
were also controlled for (self-reported stress: F(1,15) = 4.61, p = .048, SCL: F(1,15) = 4.67, p 560 
= .047) (Garrett and Sharot, 2017). In other words, participants who showed the greatest 561 
increase in SCL (which reflects the sympathetic component of the autonomic nervous system 562 
stress response (Bechara et al., 1996; Figner and Murphy, 2011) and self-reported anxiety 563 
were most likely to change their beliefs in proportion to the difference between their first 564 
estimates and the bad news received. Change in cortisol (which is suggested to reflect the 565 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (Gunnar and Quevedo, 2007) component of the 566 
stress response) did not relate to information integration for bad news (F(1,16) = .46, p > .25, 567 
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bi = -.04, ηp2 =  .03). The null result for cortisol may indicate either that the increase in bad 568 
news information integration is not associated specifically with cortisol level increase, or a 569 
Type II error. Ratings of emotional arousal, familiarity and information integration 570 
parameters for good news (αG) were also significant predictors in the regression (see Table 2 571 
for parameter estimates of covariates).  572 
 573 
For completeness we repeated the analysis on information integration parameters for good 574 
news, αG (including information integration parameters for bad news, αB, and all possible 575 
covariates mentioned above) and found no significant effects (change in self report: F(1,16) = 576 
.47, p > .25, bi = -.01; change in SCL: F(1,16) = .61, p > .25, bi = .03; change in cortisol:  577 
F(1,16) = .72, p > .25, bi = .07).  578 
 579 
Finally, we examined whether the same results are observed when controlling for within-580 
subject covariates at the within-subject level and between-subject factors at the between-581 
subject level. Specifically, for each participant we computed an alternative set of information 582 
integration parameters by correlating absolute estimation error and update controlling for the 583 
same within-subject covariates as above (first estimate, vividness, familiarity, past experience 584 
and emotional arousal) but controlling for them on a trial by trial basis. We then examined 585 
whether these alternative information integration parameters for bad news related to changes 586 
in self-reported anxiety and/or changes in SCL (additional between subject factors - initial 587 
self-report and the alternative information integration parameters for good news - were also 588 
entered as control variables). Indeed, both effects were significant using this approach 589 
(change in self report: F(1,31) =  10.57, p = .003, bi = .05; change in SCL: F(1,31) = 4.51, p = 590 
.04, bi = .08, Fig. 4a, b), while the equivalent analysis on information integration parameters 591 
from good news was not (change in self report: F(1,31) = .001, p = > .25, bi = -.001; change 592 
in SCL: F(1,31) = .55, p = > .25, bi = .036).  593 
 594 
The results of Experiment I suggested that inducing threat abolishes valence dependent 595 
asymmetry in information integration. Thus, the previously observed bias in information 596 
integration (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 597 
2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) is not constant but changes with perceived 598 
threat in the environment.    599 
 600 
Experiment II  601 
Next we set out to extend our findings from Experiment I in a natural setting. Here, we did 602 
not fashion a perceived threat, but instead measured anxiety in an environment in which 603 
perceived threats would be naturally volatile. Specifically, firefighters from the state of 604 
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Colorado performed the belief update task whilst on duty at their respective fire stations. We 605 
targeted this group of participants because they would have a naturally large range of anxiety 606 
levels owing to the volatile nature of their profession. Changes in cortisol levels were not 607 
found to be a significant predictor of information integration parameters for bad news in 608 
Experiment I. Therefore, we ruled out collecting this as a measure in Experiment II. Whilst 609 
changes in self-reported anxiety and changes in SCR were both found to be significant 610 
predictors in Experiment I, these two measures were correlated with one another (r(33) = .39, 611 
p = .02). Since self-reported anxiety had the larger effect size and was easier to collect, we 612 
opted to make this our main measure.  613 
 614 
Self-reported anxiety was significantly correlated (r(26) = -.51, p < .01) with the bias in 615 
information integration (that is αG minus αB). In particular, heightened anxiety was associated 616 
with a reduction in the bias. This result remained significant when controlling for possible 617 
confounds (see Methods), F(1,23) = 6.67, p = .02, ηp2 = .23, bi = -.05. 618 
 619 
To examine whether the relationship between heightened anxiety and reduced bias was the 620 
result of increased sensitivity to bad news, reduced sensitivity to good news, or both we first 621 
constructed a GLM in which information integration parameters for bad news (αB) was 622 
regressed on self-reported anxiety, controlling for possible confounds (mean first estimates, 623 
mean ratings of prior experience and number of bad news trials, see Methods for details). In 624 
addition, to ensure effects were valence-specific and could not be accounted for by general 625 
changes in information integration, information integration parameters for good news (αG) 626 
were also added as a covariate (note however that the self-reported anxiety effect pertains if 627 
we omit this covariate: F(1,23) = 9.77, p = .005). This analysis revealed that self-reported 628 
anxiety significantly explained the variance in information integration parameters for bad 629 
news, αB (F(1,22) = 10.52, p = .004, ηp2 = .32, bi = .05; Table 4), an effect which remained 630 
significant if estimation errors are also controlled for (F(1,21) = 9.79, p = .005) (Garrett and 631 
Sharot, 2017). The higher the acute anxiety reported by a firefighter, the more likely the 632 
firefighter was to integrate bad news into beliefs in proportion to the difference between their 633 
first estimations and the information provided. In this model, information integration from 634 
good news (F(1,22) = 4.69, p = .04) was also a significant predictor of information integration 635 
from bad news. There were no floor or ceiling effects for αG or αB (all at p < .001, one sample 636 
t-tests against values of 0 and 1).  637 
 638 
We then conducted the same analysis on information integration parameters for good news 639 
(αG) with information integration parameters for bad news (αB), mean first estimates, mean 640 
ratings of prior experience and number of good news trials as covariates. This revealed a non-641 
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significant trend in the opposite direction than for information integration parameters for bad 642 
news, αB (F(1,22) = 3.86, p = .06, ηp2 = .15, bi = -.05), such that greater self-reported anxiety 643 
was related to a trend for less information integration in response to good news. Information 644 
integration parameters for bad news (αB) was also significant (F(1,22) = 7.44, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 645 
.25, bi = 0.75).  646 
 647 
Finally, we examined whether the same results are observed when controlling for within-648 
subject covariates at the within-subject level and between-subject factors at the between-649 
subject level. Under this alternative approach higher self-reported anxiety was related to 650 
greater information integration in response to bad news (F(1,24) = 8.34, p = .008, bi = .03, 651 
Fig. 5a). For good news the opposite effect was found such that higher self-reported anxiety 652 
was related to reduced information integration (F(1,24) = 4.80, p = .038, bi = -.045, Fig. 5b). 653 
It is interesting that this latter effect was observed only in Experiment 2 and not Experiment 654 
1, which may indicate that natural real-life threats could have an especially strong impact on 655 
information integration processes. 656 
 657 
These results suggest that anxiety is related to a valence-dependent enhancement in the ability 658 
to adjust beliefs in response to new information. We highlight that whilst in Experiment I, 659 
threat was manipulated and thus causation could be inferred by comparing the threat 660 
manipulation and control groups, Experiment II was conducted to reveal an association in 661 
“real life”. Together, the experiments suggest that under a perceived threat (whether 662 
manipulated or naturally occurring) positively biased integration of information is not 663 
observed.  664 
 665 
Discussion  666 
Our results provide evidence that the well-documented asymmetry in belief formation 667 
evaporates under perceived threat. Specifically, Experiment I shows that in a low threat 668 
environment individuals integrated information asymmetrically, faithfully incorporating good 669 
news into their existing beliefs while relatively disregarding bad news (Eil and Rao, 2011; 670 
Sharot et al., 2011). Under perceived threat however, this asymmetry disappeared; 671 
participants showed an increased capacity to integrate bad news into prior beliefs. Increased 672 
physiological arousal and self-reported anxiety were found to correlate with enhanced 673 
integration of unfavorable information into beliefs. In Experiment II, firefighters on duty who 674 
reported higher state anxiety also exhibited greater selective integration of bad news. Because 675 
the increase in information integration in both experiments was valence specific it cannot 676 
reflect a general improvement in learning, and because memory for the information presented 677 
was not affected, modulation of attention is an unlikely explanation. 678 
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 679 
The finding that the positivity bias in belief updating alters flexibly as a function of perceived 680 
threat reveals a potentially adaptive mechanism. In particular, the relative failure to 681 
incorporate bad news into prior beliefs leads to positively biased beliefs (also known as the 682 
optimism bias). This bias can lead to both positive effects – including increased exploration 683 
(Berger-Tal and Avgar, 2012) and motivation (Bandura, 1989) - and negative effects – 684 
including failure to take precautionary action. It has been suggested that overestimating the 685 
likelihood of attaining rewards and underestimating the likelihood of harm is adaptive in 686 
environments where potential gains are sufficiently greater than costs (Johnson and Fowler, 687 
2011). This is because under uncertainty, optimistically biased individuals will claim 688 
resources (e.g., a spouse or a job) they could not otherwise attain, as better but less optimistic 689 
competitors may walk away from the fight. Moreover, overestimating the value of novel 690 
environments can lead to increased rate of exploration allowing the opportunity for the true 691 
value of an environment to be learned quicker (Berger-Tal and Avgar, 2012; Sutton and 692 
Barto, 1998), which is associated with superior performance in behaviours such as 693 
reproduction (Egas and Sabelis, 2001) and foraging (Rutz et al., 2006). However, in 694 
environments where potential harm is considerably greater than potential reward, 695 
computational models suggest the optimism bias to be disadvantageous (Johnson and Fowler, 696 
2011). Thus, a valence dependent bias in information integration that disappears under threat 697 
could be optimal in enabling a more accurate assessment of risk.  698 
 699 
In our experiments, the source of the threat was unrelated to the information content of the 700 
task. Thus, acute stress had a valence-specific, yet general, effect on how participants used 701 
information to alter their beliefs (i.e. in response to a social threat, participants did not 702 
selectively increase their response to information about social judgment, but to negative 703 
information in general). Indeed, many threat induction methods, including threat of electric 704 
shock, Cold Pressor Tasks and the Trier Social Stress Test, produce general changes to 705 
behavior and neural responses that are not confined to the source of the threat itself 706 
(Cavanagh et al., 2010; Lenow et al., 2017; Otto et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2013; Youssef 707 
et al., 2012). Similar findings have been observed in non-human animals, where different 708 
stressors have been shown to alter the degree of positive biases in a range of decision-making 709 
tasks (Harding et al., 2004; Matheson et al., 2008; Rygula et al., 2013). This may be adaptive, 710 
as threat may signify a dangerous environment that requires a general enhancement of 711 
caution.  712 
 713 
However, if perceived threat is prolonged or dissociated from reality, enhanced integration of 714 
negative information over long periods of time could lead to psychiatric problems. We have 715 
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previously shown that patients suffering from Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) exhibit 716 
increased updating of beliefs in response to negative information relative to healthy controls 717 
(Garrett et al., 2014). MDD is often triggered by a stressful life event (Caspi et al., 2003; 718 
Roiser et al., 2012). In individuals predisposed to MDD such a stressful life event (or series of 719 
such events) could result in prolonged periods of perceived threat and thus increased 720 
sensitivity to negative information. This in turn can form pessimistic beliefs, a symptom of 721 
MDD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Strunk et al., 2006), leading to even greater 722 
perceived threat about one’s environment. It is possible that a similar mechanism may 723 
contribute to symptoms observed in other clinical pathologies such as in clinical anxiety and 724 
phobia. 725 
 726 
We speculate that stress in response to perceived threat may interfere with top down control 727 
mechanisms that may normally inhibit integration of unwanted information (for review see 728 
Yu, 2016). A second, not mutually exclusive, possibility is that the stress reaction directly 729 
boosts the neural representation of estimation errors generated from bad, but not good, news. 730 
Indeed, it has been shown that negative prediction errors in dopamine rich striatal nuclei are 731 
selectively amplified under threat (Robinson et al., 2013) - a modulation that could be 732 
mediated by stress-induced changes to dopamine release (Frank et al., 2004; Lemos et al., 733 
2012; Schultz et al., 1997; Sharot et al., 2012a). Future studies are required to test these 734 
hypotheses. 735 
 736 
In sum, our results provide evidence that asymmetric information integration is not set in 737 
stone, but changes acutely in response to the environment, decreasing under perceived threat. 738 
Such flexibility could be adaptive, potentially enhancing our likelihood to respond to 739 
warnings with caution in environments where future costs may be high, but enabling us to 740 
maintain positive beliefs otherwise, a strategy that has been suggested, on balance, to increase 741 
well-being (McKay and Dennett, 2010).  742 
  743 
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Figures and Tables 868 
 869 
Figure 1. Behavioral Task.  870 
On each trial, participants were presented with a short description of an adverse event and 871 
asked to estimate how likely this event was to occur to them in the future. They were then 872 
presented with the probability of that event occurring to someone from the same age, location 873 
and socio-economic background as them. The second session was the same as the first except 874 
that the average probability of the event to occur was not presented. Examples of trials for 875 
which the participant’s estimate was (a) higher or (b) lower than the statistical information 876 
provided leading to receipt of good and bad news respectively. 877 
  878 
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 879 
Figure 2. Manipulation Check.  880 
Measures of (a) self-reported state anxiety, (b) skin conductance and (c) cortisol levels were 881 
greater after manipulation relative to before in the threat manipulation group compared to the 882 
control group. Time points for cortisol measurements are as follows: t0 = before threat/control 883 
manipulation procedure; t1 = immediately after threat/control manipulation procedure, prior 884 
to undertaking the task (+10 min from t0); t2 = halfway through the task (+30min from t0); t3 885 
= after completion of task and post experiment questionnaires (+1hr from t0).   886 
** p < .050; Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 887 
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 889 
Figure 3. Bias in Information Integration Parameters Vanishes under Threat 890 
manipulation. 891 
While the control group showed asymmetrical information integration parameters (α) in 892 
response to good and bad news, this bias vanished in the threat manipulation group, due to an 893 
increase in αB (information integration parameter for bad news). The Group*Valence 894 
interaction was significant, controlling for all covariates identified in Table 1 (see Methods). 895 
** p < .05 independent/paired sample t test as appropriate; Error bars represent standard error 896 
of the mean. 897 
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 899 
Figure 4. Greater integration of bad news related to state anxiety and SCL.  900 
Following the manipulation, an increase in both a. self-reported anxiety (bi = .049, p = .003, 901 
ηp
2
 = .25) and b. skin conductance (SCL) (bi = .076, p = .042, ηp2 = .13) were related to larger 902 
information integration from bad news, correcting for possible confounds. Plotted are the 903 
partial regression plots from two linear models (one for self-report and one for SCL) that 904 
control for additional covariates.  905 
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 907 
Figure 5. State anxiety in firefighters differentially relate to integration of good and bad 908 
news. Subjective state anxiety scores (STAI) of firefighters on shift were related to larger 909 
information integration from bad news (bi = .03, p = .008, ηp2 = .26) and lower information 910 
integration from good news (bi = -0.045, p = .038, ηp2 = .17), correcting for possible 911 
confounds. Plotted are the partial regression plots for a. bad news (partial αB) and b. good 912 
news (partial αG) from 2 separate linear models (one for bad news and one for good news) 913 
that control for additional covariates.  914 
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Threat Manipulation 
Group mean (SD) Control Group mean (SD) 
BDI and Baseline Stress Levels   
BDI 5.79 (5.23) 4.69 (3.22) 
Initial Self Report STAIG 10.37 (2.65) 8.63 (1.36) 
Initial SCL 6.27 (3.29) 5.90 (3.20) 
Initial Cortisol (log transformed) -1.99 (0.59) -1.79 (0.53) 
Task Variables   
First Estimates 29.82 (5.62)V 31.05 (5.89)V 
Subjective Scales Questionnaire 
 1 = low to 6 = high 
Bias  
(Good News – Bad News) 
Vividness  0.41 (0.72)V 0.72 (0.65)V 
Familiarity 0.30 (0.69) 0.49 (0.62)V 
Prior experience 0.18 (0.61) 0.33 (0.41)V 
Emotional arousal 0.33 (0.63)V 0.13 (0.86) 
Negativity 0.20 (0.49) -0.13 (0.58) 
Other Task-related variables   
Number of Trials -1.58 (8.99) -1.56 (9.70) 
Memory errors -1.23 (3.16) -0.21 (4.52) 
Estimation errors (absolute) -0.82 (5.27) 1.11 (5.84) 
Update 2.60 (12.67) 4.21 (7.83)V 
 917 
Table 1. BDI, Initial Self-Report STAI, Initial SCL, Initial Cortisol, Task-related 918 
variables, subjective scales, memory in Experiment I. Note that Estimation errors and 919 
Update (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the information integration 920 
parameters (αG and αB) for each participant.  921 
G Difference between Threat Manipulation and Control Groups, tested using independent 922 
sample t-tests (p<0.05).  923 
V Significant effect of valence (p<0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the bias scores 924 
(difference between good and bad news) on each group separately.  925 
 926 
 927 
 928 
 929 
 930 
 931 
 932 
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 933 
  bi 
Std. 
Error t p 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
ηp
2 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Initial Self Report STAI -0.01 0.01 -1.10 0.29 -0.04 0.01 0.07 
First estimates 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.39 -0.01 0.02 0.05 
Vividness rating  -0.09 0.05 -1.84 0.09 -0.20 0.01 0.17 
Familiarity rating 0.08 0.04 2.16 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.23 
Prior experience rating  -0.04 0.06 -0.76 0.46 -0.17 0.08 0.04 
Emotional arousal rating -0.13 0.04 -3.03 0.01 -0.22 -0.04 0.37 
Information integration 
parameter, good news (αG) 0.39 0.15 2.60 0.02 0.07 0.71 0.30 
 934 
Table 2. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment I.  935 
First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings on subjective scales (vividness, 936 
familiarity, past experience and emotional arousal) and αG (information integration 937 
parameters for good news) were entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in αB 938 
(information integration parameters for bad news). 939 
 940 
  941 
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 Mean (SD) 
BDI 6.82 (7.45) 
Task Variables  
First EstimatesV 31.22 (6.96) 
Subjective Scales Questionnaire 
 1 = low to 6 = high 
Bias  
(Good News – Bad News) 
Prior experienceV 0.54 (0.94) 
Negativity 0.31 (0.90) 
Other Task-related variables  
Number of TrialsV -10.89 (9.41) 
Memory errors -2.18 (6.51) 
Estimation errors (absolute)V -2.91 (5.16) 
UpdateV 9.49 (12.04) 
 942 
Table 3. Task-related variables, subjective scales and memory in Experiment II. Note 943 
that Estimation errors and Update (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the 944 
information integration parameters (αG and αB) for each participant. 945 
V Significant effect of valence (p<0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the mean bias 946 
scores (difference between good and bad news) for each participant.  947 
 948 
  
 
 
 bi 
Std. 
Error t p 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
ηp
2 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
First estimates 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.97 -0.02 0.02 0.00 
Prior experience rating  -0.03 0.09 -0.31 0.76 -0.21 0.15 0.00 
Number of bad news trials 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.99 -0.03 0.03 0.00 
Information integration 
parameter, good news (αG) 0.34 0.16 2.17 0.04 0.02 0.67 0.18 
 949 
Table 4. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment II. 950 
First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings of past experience, number of bad 951 
news trials and αG (information integration parameters for good news) were entered as 952 
covariates to account for fluctuations in αB (information integration parameters for bad news).  953 
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BDI and Baseline Stress Levels   
BDI 5.79 (5.23) 4.69 (3.22) 
Initial Self Report STAIG 10.37 (2.65) 8.63 (1.36) 
Initial SCL 6.27 (3.29) 5.90 (3.20) 
Initial Cortisol (log transformed) -1.99 (0.59) -1.79 (0.53) 
Task Variables   
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Emotional arousal 0.33 (0.63)V 0.13 (0.86) 
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Estimation errors (absolute) -0.82 (5.27) 1.11 (5.84) 
Update 2.60 (12.67) 4.21 (7.83)V 
 
Table 1. BDI, Initial Self-Report STAI, Initial SCL, Initial Cortisol, Task-related variables, 
subjective scales, memory in Experiment I. Note that Estimation errors and Update (the final two rows) 
are the variables used to compute the information integration parameters (αG and αB) for each participant.  
G Difference between Threat Manipulation and Control Groups, tested using independent sample t-tests 
(p<0.05).  
V Significant effect of valence (p<0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the bias scores (difference 
between good and bad news) on each group separately.  
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Initial Self Report STAI -0.01 0.01 -1.10 0.29 -0.04 0.01 0.07 
First estimates 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.39 -0.01 0.02 0.05 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment I.  
First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings on subjective scales (vividness, familiarity, 
past experience and emotional arousal) and αG (information integration parameters for good news) were 
entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in αB (information integration parameters for bad news). 
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BDI 6.82 (7.45) 
Task Variables  
First EstimatesV 31.22 (6.96) 
Subjective Scales Questionnaire 
 1 = low to 6 = high 
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(Good News – Bad News) 
Prior experienceV 0.54 (0.94) 
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Table 3. Task-related variables, subjective scales and memory in Experiment II. Note that 
Estimation errors and Update (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the information 
integration parameters (αG and αB) for each participant. 
V Significant effect of valence (p<0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the mean bias scores (difference 
between good and bad news) for each participant.  
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Information integration 
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Table 4. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment II. 
First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings of past experience, number of bad 
news trials and αG (information integration parameters for good news) were entered as 
covariates to account for fluctuations in αB (information integration parameters for bad news).  
 
